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The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the
Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights
Brice DicksoW
Professor ofInternational and Comparative Law, Queen s University Belfast
Abstract
The European Court of Human Rights has begun to refer to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in
order to support its reasoningfor interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights in a particular
wc’. But the EU Charter does not i’et have any special status in that regard! being treated by the Court
as on apar itlth numerous other documents of international law The Coi,rrs use of the Charter began
in conneclion wit/i arl/) and 12 of the Convention (the rig/it to afaniily life and the right to marn’I but
in subsequent years it Was been extended to many other Articles of the Convention. It Lc in relation to arL6
(the right to afair trial) that the Charter : influence has been most noticeable so fin; the Court having
changed its position on two important aspects ofArticle 6 partly because ofthe wording of the EU Charter.
But the influence on art.3 (in relation to the rights of asylum seekers,), art. 7 (in relation to retroactive
penal laws,), art.9 (in relation to the right to conscientious objection) and art.!] (in relation to rights of
n-tides unions,) has also been significant. The potential for the Charter to have greater influence on the
Court& jurisprudence in years to come ,-emains considerable.
The aftitude of the European Court of Human Rights to the interpretation of the
ECHR
In order to understand the way in which the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is used by the European
Court of Human Rights it is necessary’ to bear in mind the basic principles which the European Court has
developed concerning its interpretation of the ECHR. Amongst these are the commitments to interpret
the ECHR in line with its object and purpose, to treat it as “a living document” and to apply it in an
“evolutive and dynamic” way in light of present-day conditions. The interpretation should also be
undertaken with a view to ensuring that the protection afforded by the ECHR is “practical and effective,
not theoretical and illusory”.’
For many years the European Court has been willing to look at other international documents on human
rights when considering how to interpret the ECHR. To some extent it does so because of the general rule
of interpretation set out in art3 1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. although of
course that Convention is binding only on states which have ratified it and the Council of Europe is not
one of those “states”. It is generally accepted, however, that art.3 I reflects the position adopted by customary
international law regarding the interpretation of treaties, which in turn is based on traditional state practice
and custom. Article 3 1(1) says that a treaty must be interpreted “in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
This arliele emerged from a paper given ala Cohltsquiutn held by the Franco-British Lanvers’ S,tc,ety in Belfast tin November 22, 2013. I am
grateihi to resjmrees provided on that ocest,,n
See, generally. K Reid 4 Jowl ii,, riser Gunk irs tine Jr ,rnyeuii I ‘sane tEnon car Jlrunwr IflgIiI . 4th edn (La ndon Sweet & Maxwell. 2011
pp 57—73, p Leach. hiking e, (‘sire sri the Lrsrnpernr (con s.f i/unison Thgint..Jrd edit (Oxford Oxford Untversuy Picas. 20 t I), Cli 5. B Ramey, E.
Wicks and C Ovey, .Irscnsh,s, It ink nod (ires l/e Lunsperts; (‘uos’eotinsn nsa Hnirncisn ThgI,,s, 6th edn (Oxford Oxford University Press, 20(4), Cli 4.
Di Harris, M. O’Boyle. E P Bates and C M Buckley, Los’ rift/ne Eunspcnn ( ‘ooventtan on Htuorrn Thgho, 2nd edn (Oxford Oxford University Press,
2(1(19), pp.5—IS In this adicle. reflerenees to “the European Cost’s” are intended to relate to the European Coon of Human Righls
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purpose”. This might suggest that part of “the context” within which the ECHR should be interpreted is
the fact that 28 of the 47 European states which have ratified the ECHR have also ratified the EU Charter.
Bitt art.3 1(2) negates such a suggestion in that it makes it clear that “the context” only comprises, in
addition to the treaty’s text, preamble and annexes, “any instrument which was made by one or more
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument
related to the treaty”. it cannot reasonably be argued that the EU Charter was made “in connection with
the conclusion” of the ECHR, since the loner pre-dated the former by more than 50 years. Article 3 1(3)
is more helpful. It says that, together with “the context”, states must take into account, when interpreting
a treaty, “any relevant rules of intemational law applicable in the relations between the parties”. At a
stretch this would allow the European Court to use the EU Charter to help interpret the ECHR in a case
where the respondent state is a patty to both. One has to say “at a stretch” because the rules of international
law contained within the EU Charter are intended to regulate how each Member State in the EU treats
people within its ownjurisdiction and so cannot truly be said to be “applicable in the relations between
the parties”.
One of the recent cases in which the Grand Chamber of the European Court clearly set out its approach
to how other provisions of international law could influence its interpretation of the ECHR is DarnEr v
Turkey,3 where what was at issue, as we shall see later, was the compatibility of Turkey’s laws on trade
unions with art. 11 of the ECHR. During the course of its consideration of Turkey’s laws the European
Court said:
the Court has never considered the provisions of the Convention as the sole framework of reference
for the interpretation of the rights and freedoms enshrined therein. On the contrary, it must also take
into account any relevant rules and principles of international law applicable in relations between
the Contracting Parties.”
The Court then went on to refer to the diversity of international texts and instruments used for the
interpretation of the Convention, including “relevant international treaties that are applicable in the
particular sphere” (e.g. the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the ILO Forced Labour
Convention), the “general principles of law recognised by civilized nations”4 (e.g. the prohibition of
torture), non-binding instruments of Council of Europe organs, in particular recommendations and
resolutions of the Committee of Ministers and the ParLiamentary Assembly but also the work of the
European Commission for Democracy through Law (“the Venice Commission”), and the international
law background to the legal question before it. Importantly, the Court stressed that in searching for common
ground among norms of international law it has never distinguished between sources of law according to
whether or not they have been signed or ratified by the respondent state. Thus, the Court was guided by
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights even before that instrument became binding on EU states on
December I, 2009. Summing up in DeniEr i’ Turkey the Court said:
“The Court, in defining the meaning of terms and notions in the text of the Convention, can and must
take into account elements of international law other than the Convention, the interpretation of such
elements by competent organs, and the practice of European States reflecting their common values.
The consensus emerging from specialised international instruments and from the practice of
Contracting States may constitute a relevant consideration for the Court when it interprets the
provisions of the Convention in specific cases
... It will be sufficient for the Court that the relevant
international instruments denote a continuous evolution in the norms and principles applied in
‘inrkct (2009138 E Ft R R 54
Demer iiirA’y (2009) 4S E ft R It 54 at 1671.
This phrase is also used in art 38(1 )(c) of the Statute sf the International Court ,CJtislfte
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international jaw or in the domestic law of the majority of member States of the Council of Europe
and show, in a precise area, that there is common ground in modern societies.”
The attitude of the European Court of Human Rights to EU law
Having clarified the European Court’s attitude to the use of international law when interpreting the ECHR,it is now pertinent to consider whether the Court gives any special attention to EU law. The answer seemsto be no. This is because the occasions on which the European Court is confronted with EU law tend tobe ones where the issue is whether EU law is compatible with the ECHR, not whether it can influence theinterpretation of the ECHR. When assessing EU law’s compatibility with the ECHR the Court seems to
assume that the intention of those responsible for making EU law is that it should be compatible. TheEuropean Court of Human Rights is certainly of the view that the Court of Justice of the EU (formerlythe European Court of Justice) applies the ECHR when adjudicating on matters of EU law. Thus, inBosphorus [lava Yollari Turizrn v Ireland,6 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rightssaid:
“While the founding treaties of the European Communities did not contain express provisions forthe protection of human rights, the ECJ held as early as 1969 that fundamental rights were enshrinedin the general principles of Community law protected by the ECJ. By the early 1970s the ECJ had
confirmed that, in protecting such rights, it was inspired by the constitutional traditions of the memberStates and by the guidelines supplied by international human rights treaties on which the memberStates had collaborated or to which they were signatories. The Convention’s provisions were first
expLicitly referred to in 1975, and by 1979 its special significance amongst international treaties onthe protection of human rights had been recognised by the ECJ. Thereafter the ECJ began to refer
extensively to Convention provisions (sometimes where the Community legislation under itsconsideration had referred to the Convention) and latterly to this Court’s jurisprudence, the more
recent ECJ judgments not prefacing such Convention references with an explanation of their relevance ‘)to Community law.,L
LSo by mid-2005 it was clear that the two supra-national courts wished to adopt the same interpretationof the ECHR. The Bosphorus case itself concerned the seizure by Irish authorities of an airplane whichthey deemed was being used in a way which breached an EU trade embargo with the Former Republic ofYugoslavia (the FRY).’ The FRY owned the plane but had leased it to an airline based in Turkey. It was
seized in Ireland because it was being serviced there. The Irish Supreme Court referred to the ECJ thequestion whether the EC Regulation in question applied to the airplane. The ECJ answered affirmatively’and the Irish Supreme Court applied that ruling.0 But by then the embargo had been lifted and so the plane
was returned to Yugoslav Airlines. The Turkish airline then applied to the European Court of HumanRights, claiming that its right to peaceful enjoyment of its possessions, guaranteed by art. I of Protocol 1to the ECHR, had been violated. But the European Court rejected the claim, pointing out that Ireland had
no option but to apply the EC Regulation.” At the time, of course, it was not possible for the Turkishairline to claim against the European Communities in Strasbourg because only nation states were able to
ratify the ECHR and thereby acquire obligations to protect Convention rights.
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In reaching the conclusion that there had been no violation ofarti of Protocol 1 the Grand Chamber
cited art52(3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which reads:
“In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Conventionfor the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those
rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not preventUnion law providing more extensive protection.”
Dt4v655umnhat picauiuytuuu th part of the Europu Cuun4iieh-hes-ne4iirisdic4iemover-ejms jthat there has been a violation of the EU Charter, to ass at gnñcall3s4heHhe-meaningn scope of
rights in the Charter “shall b jaus’%hecorresponding rights in the ECHR. But the assertion again
,_j1
eoufls ovcL icrefflfion of rig! at a: tie&i
between the two
• L
This is doubtless a desirable goal but, because the precise question confronting the two courts in relationto the same facts may not always be identical, it is possible to imagine situations where the conclusions
reached by the courts appear to be inconsistent. One can think, for instance, of the cases that went to bothLuxembourg and Strasbourg concerning the legality of providing information within ireland about abortion
services available outside Ireland. The position under BC law came before the ECJ in Society for theProtection ofthe Unborn Child (SF UC) v Grogan,’ where a pro-life organisation had obtained an injunction
against students’ unions in Ireland preventing them from publicising the addresses of abortion clinics inGreat Britain.” The ECJ upheld the legality ofthe injunction because the student unions did not themselvesprovide abortion services outside Ireland (or at all) and so had no right to advertise such services in Ireland.The ECJ said that, in cases involving national legislation “lying outside the scope of Community law”, ithad nojurisdiction to “provide the national court with all the elements of interpretation which are necessaryin order to enable it to assess the compatibility of [nationalj legislation with the fundamental rights—aslaid down in particular in the European Convention on Human Rights”.’4
Two counselling agencies in Dublin then proceeded with their claim that the injunction obtained bySPUC violated th agencies’ rights to freedom of expression as guaranteed by art.l0 of the ECHR.” InOpen Door Counselling and Dublin Well Woman Centre v Ireland’° the Strasbourg Court held, by 15 to
eight.” that the injunction was indeed a violation of art.1O. It also violated women’s rights under art.lOto receive information. Despite Ireland’s legitimate interest in protecting the life of the unborn, the injunction
was a disproportionate way of doing this because it imposed a blanket ban and created a health risk to
some women. Now that the EU Charter is part of EU law one might imagine that the decision of the ECJin SF UC v Grogan is no longer good law because the Charter unequivocally protects the right to freedom
of expression.t But it has to be remembered that the EU Charter applies “to the institutions, bodies, offices
and agencies of the Union ... and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law”.”When regulating the availability of information on abortion facilities a Member State is still not
“implementing Union law”.
The European Court has cited the EU Charter in a number of contexts, including art.2 of the ECI-IR(the right to life), art.3 (the right not to be ill-treated), art.5 (the right to liberty), afl,6 (the right to a fairtrial). an.7 (the right to no punishment without law), art.8 (the right to a private and family life), an.9 (the
The second sentence was not relevant to 11w facts of tIns case because EU law did suit provide more extensive protection tif the right to property1 SI’!I(’v Cmgu (C-i 59190)1 5993 E C R. 1-4655.
Li SI’( If’ (Ia’lund) Lot Gnsgun (Na 1)11 I R. 7531 S/CCt• (iniguo (C-I 59190) (19911 E CR [-4685 at (3 tI
‘‘A ‘bow,’ GL’tterUI i’ Open tutor rr,iistvc/bng Ltd unti Duhhti IVell Ihmtws ( ‘coot Lot 119 S 5) R. 593 (lii gh Coon and Supreme Co Un6 Open Dour C rtiurtcttmg “nil Dobbs, Veil U htnu,, ( ‘coca- v 1w/unit ( I 992) 513 H R R 244
“The trist, judge, John Blayney, was one of the dissenters
‘‘Alirle I 1(1).
“Article SIt). See. generally. K Lcnaarts, ‘Exploring the Limits ofthe EU ChaflcrofFundan,entat Rights’ c2ntDt S EQ L ReV 375
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right to freedom of belieD, art. 10 (the right to freedom of expression), art. II (the right to freedom of
association), art.12 (the right to marry) and art.1 of Protocol I (the right to property). It is in relation to
an.6 that the Charter has had the largest influence, its role in the other fields being a minor supportive
one. We shall begin this survey by looking at arts 8 and 12, since it was in relation to them that the EUCharter was first mentioned by the European Court. The rest of the articles will then be considered
sequentially.
Articles 8 and 12
The first reference to the Charter by the European Court was in its judgment in Goodwin v United Kingdomin 2002, just 19 months after the Charter was signed on December 7, 2000.20 In fact, when setting out the
relevant “International Texts” in that case, the only document cited by the Court was the EU Charter, inparticular art.9, which states:
“The right to many and the right to found a family shall be guaranteed in accordance with the nationallaws governing the exercise of these rights.”
In reaching its decision the European Court departed from its prior position on the rights of transsexuals,
extending to those individuals for the first time rights under both art.8 of the ECHR (the right to a familylife) and art. 12 (the right to marry). To justify its change of position the Court cited “major social changesin the institution of marriage since the adoption of the Convention as ve1I as dramatic change brought
about by developments in medicine and science in the field oftranssexuality”.2’ Noting that art. 12 of theECHR conferred the right to marry only on “men and women of marriageable age”, it added:
“The Court would also note that Article 9 of the recently adopted Charter of Fundamental Rights ofthe European Union departs, no doubt deliberately, from the wording of Article 12 of the Conventionin removing the reference to men and women.”22
The Court held unanimously that there had been violations of both art.8 and art. 12 in this case.There have been further cases on the right to many in which the EU Charter has been cited. One isSchalk v Austria,2’ where two gay men claimed the right to marry. Article 9 of the EU Charter was again
cited, as were two paragraphs from a semi-official commentary on the Charter.2 The Court stressed thatthe wording ofart.9 meant that it was still up to national laws to determine what rights to give to same-sex
couples but that the wording did permit marriage between same-sex couples. Citing what it had said inGoodwin. the Court observed:
“Regard being had to Article 9 of the Charter, therefore, the Court would no longer consider that the
right to marry enshrined in Article 12 [of the ECHRJ must in all circumstances be limited to marriagebetween two persons of the opposite sex.”2’
This is a clear example of the Court using the Charter to develop its interpretation of a Convention right, Ubut it jave reached the same decision even in the absence of the Charter, This is because the Court Jtl/ 1’paid as much, perhaps more, attention to two EU Directives, The first was Directive 2003/86/EC on the
right of family reunification (which says that “Member States may ... authorise the entry and residence
20 Goodwin v 1/oiled Kingdoi’i (2002)35 F H R.R, IR.a Goi,dwin v ! riled Kingil,rn (2002) 35 F H K R. IX 21110011. Goodwin v hilled Kingdom (2002)35 F H KR IS at [IOU)
‘ScIiaIk vAiislnu (2011)53 ERR R 20 See, generally, L Hodson, A Marriage By Any Other Name Schalk and Knpfv Austng’ (2011)11H R.L K 170, 5 L Cooper, Marriage, Family, Discrimination and Contradiction An Evaluation 0(11w Legacy and Future ofihe Eutopean Court of
—Human Rights’ Jurisprudence on LOFT Rights” (2011)12 German Li 1746 (t Wc24This was published by the EU Network oflndependent E,perts on Fundamental Rights in June 2006 and is available at hee.eunpii cii ;ii.’iicc’ /1/iindamL’nrol.riglus iilc.r oem orkco,,in,emoniinul en 1’d/ [Acressed
‘. —
-. 5cc also fn. ‘how25SchoTh o’Aualnu (2(111)53 E H.R.R 20 at [61).
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of the unmarried partner. being a third country national, with whom the sponsor is in a duly attested
stable long-tenn relationship”). The second was Directive 2004/38/EC on the rights of citizens of the EU
and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. Moreover
the approach of the European Court in Sc/ia/k v Austria is facilitative rather than mandatory: it is telling
Member States what they mm’ do, not what they must do, On the facts before it the Court held unanimously
that there had been no violation of afl.12 and by four votes to three that there had been no violation of
art.8. In a rather question-begging joint dissent, Judge Malinverni from Switzerland and Judge Kolver
from Russia said there was no need for the Court to look to other international documents when interpreting
art.12 because according to the ordinary meaning of the word “marriage” it has to be a union between
persons of the opposite sex.
In the recent case of Va/lianatos v Grecce1ñ the Grand Chamber took a further step towards the recognition
of a right to same-sex marriage. It had to consider a Greek law which permitted “civil unions”, but only
between adults of different sex. By 16 votes to one (the dissenter being Judge Pinto de Albuquerque from
Portugal) the Court held that there had been a violation of art.14 of the ECHR taken in conjunction with
artS. In the course of its judgment the Court cited art.7 (the right to family life), artQ (the right to marry)
and art.2 I (the right to non-discrimination) of the EU Charter and also the semi-official commentary.27
The Charter has also arisen in a tug-of-love case, Ncuhnger V Switzerland,’ where a mother had taken
her child from israel to Switzerland in order to escape the clutches of her husband, the father of the child.
because he had become a member of the ultra-orthodox Lubavitch movement. On this occasion the Grand
Chamber cited art24 of the Charter, which provides as follows:
4 I) Children shall have the right to such protection and care as is necessary for their well-being.
They may express their views freely. Such views shall be taken into consideration on matters
J which concern them in accordance with their age and maturity. e
In all actions relating to children, whether taken by’ public authorities or private institutions, / fL€1c
the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration. / fl,\fr’iDt”J(3) Every child shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis a personal relationship and
direct contact with both his or her parents, unless that is contrary to his or her interests.”
These provisions obviously go beyond what the ECHR says about children’s rights (which is virtually
nothing). The Court relied on paras (2) and (3) of art.24 to substantiate its finding (again by 16 votes to
one) that there would be a violation of art.8 of the ECHR if the boy Noam were returned to Israel. The
decision caused some consternation because it appeared to run counter to the principles of the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction of 1980. which most European states
have ratified. In November 2013, inXv Latvia,the Grand Chamber of the European Court (again after
citing but not relying upon arts 7 and 24 of the EU Charter) clarified its position on the interplay between
the two Conventions. It admitted that itsjudgment in Nezdinger may have given the impression that before
returning a child in compliance with the Hague Convention domestic courts are required to conduct an
in-depth examination of the entire family situation and of a whole series of other factors. But the Court
observed that its judgment in Neulinger did not in fact set out any principle for the application of the
Hague Convention by domestic courts and it added:
“The Court considers that a harmonious interpretation of the European Convention and the Hague
Convention can be achieved provided that the following two conditions are observed. Firstly, the
factors capable of constituting an exception to the child’s immediate return in application of Articles
11’
‘allmna;,u ‘ Gn’ccc t20 14) 59 E H R. R 12
27 See fn)ahove
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12. 13 and 20 of the [Hague] Convention, particularly where they are raised by one of the parties to
the proceedings, must genuinely be taken into account by the requested court. That [domestic] court
must then make a decision that is sufficiently reasoned on this point, in order to enable the [European]
Court to veri(v that those questions have been effectively examined. Secondly, these factors must be
evaluated in the light of ArticleS of the Convention.”5’
On the facts inX i’ Larvia the Grand Chamber held by nine votes to eight that because the Latvian court
had not carried out the required assessment, there was a violation of art.8. The influence of the EU Charter
on this decision is therefore identifiable, but rather indirect.
More generally, the potential influence of the EU Charter on the Strasbourg Court’s interpretation of
the right to a private and family life, and home, protected by art.8 of the ECHR, is minimal, given the
identical wording of that article and art.7 of the Charter. The former goes on to refer to the right to respect
for one’s “correspondence” while art.7 uses the word “communications”, but to date no decision of the
Strasbourg Court has alluded to this difference and it is likely to be considered legally insignificant.
Article 2
As regards art.2 of the ECHR, the impact of the EU Charter has so far been minimal, In U v France the
Grand Chamber referred to many international documents—but not the EU Charter—when considering
whether unborn children have any rights under the ECHR. However, one of the dissenting judges. Georg
Ress from Germany, cited art.3(2) of the Charter. which prohibits the reproductive cloning of human
beings. to support his view that “the protection of life extends to the initial phase of human life”. In the j
,important case of,,A11 Ireland,32 which led to the enactment of the Protection of Life During Pregnancy act/f’
Act 2013 in lreland7 the EU Charter was not cited by the European Court except to note that during the
negotiations around the Treaty of Lisbon the Irish government secured a legally binding Decision of the
Heads of State or Government of all the other EU Member States making it clear that:
“Nothing in the Treaty of Lisbon attributing legal status to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, or in the provisions of that Treaty ... affects in any way the scope and applicability
of the right to life in Article 40.3.1,40.3.4 and 40.3.3
... provided by the Constitution of Ireland.”
Article 3
As regards art.3. there have been three important cases arising in the context of migration. In the first of
these, MISS v Belgiunz,31 a complaint was raised that the procedures used in Greece for handling
asylum-seekers were so bad that they amounted to ill-treatment for the purposes of al.3. Famously, the
ECHR does not contain any right to asylum, the prevailing thought in 1949. when the Convention was
f fldrafted. being that states should be left to decide for themselves whom they would allow acrosstheir borders. The draflers were aware, as well, that negotiations for an international treaty on
asylum-seeking were already taking place in Geneva under the auspices of the United Nations. By way
of contrast with the ECHR, art. 18 of the EU Charter provides that:
“The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention of
28 July 1951 and the Protocol of3 I Janua’ 1967 relating to the status of refugees and in accordance
with the Treaty establishing the European Community.”
3”Xv Lu’u (2014)59 F H R R 3 31l105]—{lOOl.
V J’tUflL’ (2005)10 £ HR K 12
j Ac/rc/wldl20hI)53EHRR 3tV f Brought into fl,r on Januaty 2014.
1/. 34MSS v Belgium (2011)53 £ H R.R, 2
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However, in holding that Greece was in violation of art.3 of the ECHR as regards both the conditions of
detention for asylum-seekers in Greece and their living conditions in that country more generally, while
Belgium was in violation of art.3 because it returned asylum-seekers to Greece and thereby exposed them
to ill-treatment, the European Court did not rely so much on the EU Charter as on the broader idea of
“fundamental rights”. This is because the Treaty of the European Union, as amended by the Treaty of
Lisbon as from December 1, 2009, provides not just that the EU “recognises the rights, freedoms and
principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights” but also that “fundamental rights, as guaranteed
by the [ECHR] and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall
constitute general principles of the Union’s law”. This again illustrates the point that, as far as the protection
of human rights between the 28 states in the EU and the 47 states in the Council of Europe is concerned,
there is a two-way street: the European Court can look to the EU Charter as a source of rights, but likewise(and to a greater extent) the Court of Justice of the EU can look to the ECHR as a source of rights. A
further source common to both courts is “the constitutional traditions common to the Member States”. In
the later case of Tarakhel v Lifter/and,3’ the Grand Chamber in Strasbourg applied its reasoning in MSS
i’Be/gium when holding that it would be a violation ofan.3 of the ECHR if an Afghani couple and their
six children were to be returned by Switzerland to Italy without the Swiss authorities having first obtained
individual guarantees from the Italian authorities that the family would be kept together and taken charge
of”in a manner adapted to the age of the children”.3” The Swiss authorities had not yet been given sufficient
assurances to that effect.
In the third case on art.3, Hirsi .Jamaa v Italy,3’ the European Court had to consider whether Italy had
violated art.3 by stopping a boat full of potential asylum-seekers on the High Seas (in the Mediterranean)
and returning them to Libya. The Court cited art. 19(2) of the EU Charter. which reads:
“No one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or
she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.”
The Court obviously used this as further support for the principle of non-refoulement, which it has long
espoused. It would have reached the same conclusion even if it had not cited the EU Charter at all. As
with art.2, the influence of the EU Charter on the Court’s interpretation of art.3 of the ECHR has been
very slight indeed.
Article S
in relation to art.5 (the right to liberty), the Court has once again made only fleeting use of the EU Charter.
This was in Saadi v United Kingdom,3’ where an Iraqi doctor had been detained in the UK while awaiting
a decision on his application for asylum, even though he had applied for asylum immediately upon arrival
in the country’ and was not a person likely to refuse to notify his whereabouts. The UK Government argued
that his detention was a mailer of administrative convenience, allowing his application to be dealt with
more expeditiously, and the domestic appeal courts accepted that point of view? When the case reached
Strasbourg it was, amazingly, the first occasion on which the Court had had to interpret art.5( I )(fl of the
ECHR, which permits a deprivation of liberty “to prevent [the detainee] effecting an unauthorised entry
into the country”. While agreeing with the domestic appeal courts by II votes to six that this wording
Thrukhci ,‘Si, srreriu,ii (App No 29217112), judgment of November 3.23)14 The couh cited, ilh apparent arpm al. the words of Lord Ken’ inthe decision ofthe UK supreme cowl in it (J:t Entn’s v Y,ecrerun ‘[crust’ for the Home Department 120141 UKSC 12 at [42]. wheic he pointed
out that violaitons of afl.3 do not require thai the conditions complained about be the product of systemic shortcomings
“it (LAithritreci)) v.SccreiancéSroscfi,rthe Home Depanmrnr [20131 UK5C 12 at 1122]
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extended to people who had actually entered the country before immediately applying for asylum, the
Court relied principally on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and on “relevant rules and
principles of international law applicable in relations between the Contracting Parties”, citing Bosphorus
v Ireland (discussed abov&). Article IS of the EU Charter, on the right to asylum, was merely cited en
passant.4’ The six dissenting judges placed greater reliance on art.18, but they focused more on Council
Directive 2005/85/EC, wluch stipulates minimum standards on procedures for granting and withdrawing
refugee status. Article 18(1) of that Directive reads:
“Member States shall not hold a person in detention for the sole reason that he/she is an applicantfor asylum.”
Article 6
The decisions of the European Court of Human Rights relating to art.6 in this context are all significant,
although it would be improper to suggest that any of them were reached specifically and only because of
relevant provisions in the EU Charter.
in Eskelinen v Finlanct2 the question arose as to which category of public servants could benefit from
the protections afforded to litigants by art.6. Traditionally art.6 lwLbeen limited to non-public servants Ll/because claims made by public servants were taken as not constituting claims relating to “civil rights and L
obligations” as required by art.6. The category of people eligible for protection was extended in Pellegrin
v France,4’ but very soon that test came under new scrutiny as well. in Eskeilnen the Court extended the
eligible category still further and in doing so cited an.47 of the EU Charter. which reads (in part):
I) Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has Jrthe right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid / Li”
—down in this Article. / n.rrcj)T2) Evetwone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independentI and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility ofbeing advised, defended and represented.”
The Court cited from the “Explanations” relating to the EU Charter which were prepared tinder thePraesidium of the Convention that drafted the Charter (led by former French President Giscard D’Estaing)
and integrated into the Final Act of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (the version prior tothe Treaty of Lisbon).44 The Court said that these Explanations were “a valuable tool of interpretationintended to clari& the provisions of the Charter” and it observed that in EU law the right to a fair hearing
was not confined to disputes relating to civil rights and obligations and to criminal matters. The Court
added: “in this respect the Charter codified existing case law of the Court of Justice of the EuropeanCommunities”, citing Johnston v C11I1 ef Constable oft/ic Royal Ulster Constabulan.’ In Eskeilnen theCourt found a violation of art.6(l) of the ECHR in relation to the length of proceedings (by 14 v 3) butno violation in relation to the lack ofan oral hearing (unanimously). It also found a breach ofart.l3 (by15 v 2). It was developments in EU law (not just through the Charter) which mainly prompted the Courtto change its stance in this case, even though to support its view that “European law generally ... provides
l /40 See the text at inn ‘,4 / 2,.Saus/, v United K’ngi!w’ (20085 17 E H K K t7 at12 Exke/urcn v Jot/rind t2007) 45 E H R R. 41
‘‘ pci/ego,, v /‘mnec (2001)31 E.H KR. 26
Jjskc/inen Jiniunci (20071 45 U H K K 43 at (30[ The Explaoattnrts are available at cur./e.t crnrrpcr.ert Levi [riSen Levi ‘rrSenrin0rirr I ]Oft .20f1’:303.0017:0035 cn:J’DE lAceessed January 9,20151. They should not be confused “ith the Commentary etted at fn bove45juharri,,t p hief (unsluhk WI/re Rut t Liner f’oimlahtt/ufl (22183) [19861 U CR. 1561 [9871 Q 8 12
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useful guidance” it cited only Strasbourg case law, namely Goodwin v United Kingdom,4” Posit v Finland
(2O02)’ and Meftah v France (2002).’ 4In Micallef v Malta1’ the applicant’s sister had been injuncted in an .&.hearing from hanging out cI.t9r rr
clothes to dry above the courtyard of another person’s apartment. Up to then the European Court had not L
extended the protection of art.6 to interim decisions, even if they affected civil rights and obligations, but
in this case it again decided to change its position. Citing its obligation to adopt an evolutive approach,
and referring to ad.47 of the EU Charter (quoted above), it held that a new approach was called for. On
the facts, it held by II votes to six that art.6( I) had been violated as far as its requirement of impartiality
was concerned. The Court also relied on a decision of what was then the ECJ in Denilauler v SNC Coucher
Frères,” which had held that provisional measures taken by a court without hearing the defendant could
not be recognised under EU law.
Finally, in relation to art.6, in Michaud v France” a lawyer challenged the French National Bar Council’s
decision to adopt regulations on procedures for requiring lawyers to notify their suspicions that their clients
may have been involved in money laundering or terrorist financing, He argued that this violated the
principles of confidentiality and independence concerning lawyers. which he saw as essential aspects of
the fundamental right to a fair trial. But the CJEU had already found against the Belgian Bar Associations
on this issue in 2007, and the Court at Strasbourg held unanimously that art.6 had not been violated. In
the course of its judgment the Court endorsed the approach it took to EU law in the Bosphoijus case 4&.l /(discussed above), while noting that the two cases were dillerent because there the EU law in question
had been a set of Regulations (not a Directive, as in Michaud v France) and in Bosphorf us the Irish c1.C /Supreme Court had referred the issue to Luxembourg whereas in Micl,atid v France the Conseil d’Etat
had not done so.
In the seminal case of Salduz v Turkey” the Grand Chamber of the European Court finally established
that persons being questioned by the police while in detention are entitled to access Legal advice. The
Court briefly referred to art.48 of the EU Charter, once more by way of a belt-and-braces approach to its
reasoning. Article 48(2) provides that:
“Respect for the rights of the defence of anyone who has been charged shall be guaranteed.”
The Court again cited art.52(3) which, as mentioned above, states that the meaning and scope of the right
guaranteed under provisions such as art.48 are the same as the equivalent right laid down by the ECHR.
Article 7
One of the clearest examples of the European Court making explicit use of the EU Charter in itsinterpretation of the ECHR occurred in Scoppola v halt’ ‘No.2).” The applicant was arguing that the
sentence he had received for serious crimes should have been imposed in accordance with the law which
was in place at the time he was sentenced, not at the time he committed the offences. Article 7 of the
ECHR says that a heavier penalty must not be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the
offence was committed, but it does not say the converse. However, art.49( I) of the EU Charter (under the
rubric “Principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties”) provides that “[i]f,
‘‘ C,,,n/wni r (:n(cd Kingdc’nt (2002) 35 E H K R IS
I’,nt v finland (003)37 E H R R 6 This ‘as a decision holding that eestrictions on fishing righis did engage and violate arlO because they didnot allow professional coastal rishenuen to challenge their impact on the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions.R L tø “ rite Court fund no violation in the Cour de Cassation’s insistence on legal representatives being members of a specialist lawyers’ associalionK rc.”’L butt - hat the Advocate General’s submissions to the Cour were not communicated to the applicants j,j I ;,.. ‘-ft4Maolk/vMoho(2010)5 H kR. 37 IszI leg lkn,&tnterv.SM I roarer fares 12579)119801 E CR 1553
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subsequent to the commission of a criminal offence, the law provides for a lighter penalty, that penalty
shall be applicable”. In Scoppola the European Court cited art.49(l) as one reason for departing from its
previous position, confirmed just six years earlier in 2003,’ that more lenient laws should not be any more
retroactive than more stringent laws should be. Amongst the other reasons given for this volte-Jàce were
that the CJEU had already held the principle of the retroactive application of the more lenient penalty to
be part of the constitutional traditions common to EU Member States.” and that the principle had also
been included in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court” and affirmed in the case law of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.”
Article 9
In relation to art. 9 of the ECHR the most interesting decision by the European Court in this context is
Bavalyan vAr,,zenia,’ the first case to be decided against Armenia. It concerned the right to conscientious
objection to military service and the Grand Chamber held by 16 votes to one (with the Armenian judge
dissenting) that such a right should indeed be read into art.9. To support this conclusion the Court cited
art.I0(2) of the EU Charter, which specifically recognises the right to conscientious objection, albeit “in
accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of this right”. The Court said:
“Such explicit addition is no doubt deliberate ... and reflects the unanimous recognition of the right
to conscientious objection by the Member States of the European Union, as well as the weight attached
to that right in modern European society.”1
The Court also cited Goodwin v United Kingdom” and noted that in 2010 the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe had cited art. 10(2) of the EU Charter when recommending that Member States of
the Council of Europe should ensure the right of conscientious objection to conscripts. The EU Charter
was also relied upon by NGO interveners in the case, including Amnesty International. the International
Commission of Jurists and the Quakers (through the Friends World Committee for Consultation).”
Article 10
Article 10 of the ECHR has also been interpreted by the European Court with the help of the EU Charter.
An example is Centro Europa 7 SRL and Di Stefano v Italy,”2 where the applicants were complaining that
the failure to allocate them the necessary frequencies for television broadcasting infringed art.l0. The
Grand Chamber, with one dissenter, held in their favour and referred indirectly to art. 11(2) of the EU
Charter, which reads simply: “The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected”. This provision
was not listed in the judgment as a “relevant international law” but it was referred to by the European
Parliament in one of its cited resolutions on the ownership of the media.
In Zaprranrs,’ r Bt,lgarsei (App No.41171/98), judgment of March 6,2(103
“ /ie,? no, (C.387/02. C.39l/02 and C-403/02), [2005] E CR. l.3565,judgmeni ofMay 3,2005 Strangely. in coining toils conclusion in these
eases, the CJEU did niH rely on the EU Chaner, even though the Charter had been proclaimed more than fo,,r years earlier by the European Commission.
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“Article 24(2) l’he statute was adopted in 1998 and came mb three iii 201)2
571n the Dniga,, Nikohc case, IT.94.2.A, Appeals Cha,nher, judgment of February 4, 2005.
“Bavar van t’Armenia (2012) 54 E II RR 15
‘ Bus urvon s’Arnse,sio (2012) 54 E H R.R. 15 at 11061.
Goodwin v tInned Kngdcm, (2002)35 E.H R.R IS. I J I
Interestingly, the Coon relied’) on tile little-known hero-American Convention on Young People’s Rights and on comments by the /lnter.Ameriean Commission on Human Ri s during a friendly settlement in a case involving Bolivia
‘2Genfm L’timpa 7Sf?!. and Di Seefiz,io v/laIr (App. No 38433/09). judgment of.lune 7,2012.
[20151 E H R.L.R.. Issue I C 2015 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors
38 European Human Rights Law Review
Article 11
The EU Charter has featured quite significantly in at least three cases involving art.] I of the ECHR (the
right to freedom of assembly and association), more particularly in the context of trade union activity.
In Sorensen i’ Denmark” two workers complained about closed-shop agreements. The Court referred
to art.l2 of the EU Charter, which reads:
“Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of associational all levels.
in particular in political, trade union and civic matters, which implies the right of everyone to form
and to join trade unions for the protection of his or her interests.”
lt1bs observed that the provisions ofthe preceding Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights /
of Workers, adopted in 1989 by II of the then 12 EC states (the UK having opted out)(’are of obvious
relevance for the interpretation of the scope of Article 12”. The Court then used the EU Charter as evidence ‘-
for the view that “there is little support in the Contracting States for the maintenance of closed-shop
agreements and
... the European instruments referred to above clearly indicate that their use in the labour
market is not an indispensable tool for the effective enjoyment of trade union freedom”. The Court found
a breach ofartli in relation to each of the applicants (by 12 to five in Sorensefl4and by 15 to two in ci/’ i”
cAtr
4 In Demir v Turkey.” cited at the beginning of this article to illustrate the way in which the European
Court makes use of international law when interpreting the ECHR. the applicants claimed that their rights
to form a trade union and to thereby engage in collective bargaining and collective agreements were being
violated because under Turkish law municipal civil servants had no such entitlements. The Grand Chamber.
in holding for the applicants, took specific account of arts 12 and 28 of the EU Charter. Article 12 has
been cited above. Article 28 reads:
“Workers and employers, or their respective organisations, have, in accordance with Community
law and national laws and practices, the right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements at the
appropriate levels and, in cases of conflicts of interest, to take collective action to defend their interests,
including strike action.”
Reminding us that in previous cases such as Goodwin v United Kingdom (2005). Sorensen v Denmark
(2006) and Eskelinen vFhzland (2007), all discussed above.6’ the Court a4keuided by the EU Charter
even though it was not yet in force, the Court confirmed that “when it considers the object and purpose
of the Convention provisions, it also takes into account the international law background to the legal
question before it”.” It went on to note that the EU Charter “has adopted an open approach to the right to
organise. declaring, in its Article 12(1), among other things. that even’one’ has the right to form and join
trade unions for the protection of his or her interests”.6’ Here the Court held unanimously that Turkey had
violated art. II ofthe ECHR by interfering with the applicants’ right to form a trade union and by annulling
a collective agreement which had been entered into by a trade union with an employing authority. It needs
to be remarked, however, tha4a far greater influence on the European Court n this casd than the EU
Charter was the Council of Europe’s own European Social Charter, first adopted in 1961 and revised in
l996,’ The Social Charter is not only home-grown and older, it has been extensively interpreted by the
European Committee on Social Rights, the opinions of which are sometimes influential on the European
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Court of Human Rights.’ The EU Charter does not yet have the same credentials, however great its
potential might be.
Most recently the EU Charter was referred to in passing by the European Court iii National Union of
Rail, Atari/line and Transport Workers v United Kingdom,” where the union unsuccessfully challenged
UK law relating to strike ballots and secondary strike action. Under “Relevant International Law” the
Court again cited arts 12 and 28 of the EU Charter (and also Protocol 30 to the Lisbon Treaty..thc no called / biJSUK opt tu1’I’) but did not later refer to the Charter in its judgment. It was taken to task for this by the
judge from Poland, Professor Krzysztof Wojtyczek, who in his otherwise concurring opinion observed
that:
“When a judgment of an international court refers to ‘relevant international law’, the reader may
legitimately expect an explanation as to why and in which respect the documents referred to in it are
relevant for the resolution of the instant case. I regret that the majority has not found necessary to
explain clearly the relevance of the international law referred to for the interpretation of Article II
of the Convention ... [l]n my view, the analysis of international law does not support the opinion
that Article 11 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
should be interpreted in such a way that it encompasses the right to sympathy strikes. To hold otherwise
exposes the Court to the risk of being legitimately criticised forjudicial activism.”2
Protocols to the ECHR
The EU Charter made a brief appearance in a case on art. I of Protocol I ofthe ECHR. the right to peaceful
enjoyment of one’s possessions. This was in Anheuser-Bnsch Inc v PortugaL” a case where the applicant
company was complaining that it had been improperly deprived of its right to use a trade mark. In
confirming that an.l of Protocol I embraces intellectual property’ the Court cited art.l7(2) of the EU
Charter, which explicitly states that “Intellectual property shall be protected”.
A more significant contribution was made by the EU Charter to the interpretation of art.4 of Protocol
7. which enshrines the ;ie bis in ide,,z principle (i.e. that a person should not be tried twice for the same
crime). In Zolotztkhin v Russia’ the applicant had been convicted of committing “minor disorderly acts”
in violation of Russia’s Administrative Code (for swearing at a public official and not responding to
reprimands after bringing his girlfriend on to a restricted military compound). Based on the same incident,
the applicant was later convicted of committing “disorderly acts” under Russia’s Criminal Code (for
insulting, and threatening violence against, a public official). To enable it to reach the conclusion that
art.4 of Protocol 7 should be interpreted so as to outlaw second trials based on the same facts (and notjust
second trials based on precisely the same offences) the European Court relied upon art,50 of the EU
Charter, which reads:
“No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings for an offence for which
he or she has already been finally acquitted or convicted within the Union in accordance with the
law.”
‘‘Forexample, in Stcfinsctn v/taft’ (App. No 21838/10), judgment ufApril 15, 2014. where (at 1641) the Court found guidance in the committee’s
holding that a sum of €461 was inadequate as a minimum monthly pension and that penstons not eNceedtng €1,000 must he considered as providing
for only basic commodities.
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UK that this ease be referred Its the Grand Chamber was rejected in September 2014
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However, as the wording of art.50 does not, in truth, seem any more directive on its face than that of afl.4
of Protocol 7, one should not perhaps read too much into the Court’s reliance on this provision. The case
is perhaps another example of the Court pulling itself up by its own boot-straps.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is clear that the EU Charter is well on its way to being a source of law for the European
Court of Human Rights, even in cases where the respondent state is not a member of the EU—we have
seen the EU Charter cited in cases involving Armenia, Russia, Switzerland and Turkey. It has also been h€
referred to in relation to issues, such as police questioning and conscientious objection, which would I1SfL, ‘‘IL
arise within EU states as pail of their implementation of Union law, one of the constraints imposed by the ‘to
Charter itself.” To date, however, the Charter has coucl played a supportive rather than a leading cld /
role. It has not been, indeed cannot be, a primary source ha%n some way usurps the ECHR itself. If in ?qJ )
future cases the CJEU interprets provisions in the Charter which overlap with those in the ECHR in a
more generous way than the European Court has done to date, it will still be open to the European Court
to maintain a different position. But a more likely scenario is that the CJEU will take its lead from the
European Court. Occasionally a matter may need to be litigated in both courts, a highly undesirable
phenomenon as regards both time and expense. Yet, failing the development of any reference procedure
from Luxembourg to Strasbourg,’6 such duplicated litigation may become the reality. Given the breadth
and generality of the provisions in the EU Charter, it is likely that many other instances will arise where
the European Court is asked to use the EU Charter in ways that will justify the Court’s development of
the existing jurisprudence on the ECHR, but the exploration of those possibilities must await another day.
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